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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No.

8138
SHERMAN J. PREECE, STATE AUDITOR OF THE STATE OF UTAH,,
Defendant.

BRIEF AND MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, State Tax Commission, brought action
against the defendant, State Auditor, to require defendant
to provide plaintiff with four-cent cigarette stamps under
the authority of 59-18-10 U. C. A. 1953 requiring the State
Auditor to prepare stamps for use on packages and containers according to such specifications, designs and denominations as may be submitted to him by the Tax Commission.
The plaintiff requisitioned said stamps under the terms of
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H. B. 34, First Special Session of the 30th Legislature,
amending Sec. 59-18-4 U. C. A. 1953 by providing that on all
cigarettes weighing less than three pounds per thousand,
two mills ( 4c per package) should be charged on each cigarette rather than one mill (2c per package) as previously
provided.
The State Auditor under the provisions of 59-18-10
and his general powers enumerated in Ch. 3 of Title 67,
U. C. A. 1953, and upon advice and opinion of the Attorney General, refused to provide stamps representing the
additional tax. The sole reason for refusal was the unconstitutionality of H. B. 34 as being in violation of Art. VII,
Sec. 6, Utah Constitution.. On that refusal the plaintiff
State Tax Commission brought action for an extraordinary
writ to compel the · State Auditor to prepare and deliver
said stamps to plaintiff.
On November 17, 1953, the Governor of the State of
Utah, ·by proclamation, called the Legislature into session
to convene December 1, 1953, and enumerated as the purpose of his call thirteen items recommended by .the Public
School Survey Commission, the Legislative Council and the
Governor himself, all of which items pertained to the public school system. None of the enumerated subjects dealt
with taxation (Exhibit A). · On December 1, 1953, the
Governor delivered his opening message to the Joint Committee of all members of the House and Senate in which
he again withheld the entire subject of taxation although
he included items for consideration of the Legislature not
called to their attention in the proclamation (Exhibit B).
That same day he communicated with both houses by letter,
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recommending legislation to control the internal financing
of universities and colleges and recommended a provision
requiring assessment of all property for property tax purposes to be made every five-year period (Exhibit C).
On December 3rd, additional matters were called to
the attention of the Legislature by letter-none included
taxation (Exhibit D).
On December 4, 1953 the Governor appeared again
before the Legislature and recommended a program of
school financing which, insofar as the state-supported program is concerned, paralleled that program theretofore proposed by the Legislative Council (Exhibit J, para. 6). In
that same message the Governor said:
"I am not here to propose new or higher taxes
to finance the school program, but I do intend to
propose changes in our present school financing Iaw
as well as certain reductions in some state services"
(Exhibit F, p~ge 6, para. 5).
At paragraph 4-F, page 8, Exhibit F, the Governor
stated further :
"The Legislative Council has devised a new
method of· establishing the uniform school levy in
the districts to support the basic school program.
The uniform levy under the old law was determined
by the levy required in the wealthiest district to
finance the basis or minimum school program in
that district. The new plan proposes a ten mill local
levy for a $3450 per unit program graduated up to
a 12 mill local levy for a $4050 program. This plan
provides that any tax yield in excess of the minimum
program for any district would revert to the Uniform School Fund for distribution to the remaining
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school districts. I recommend that the legislation to
implement this plan as prepared by the Legislative
Council be adopted."
Paragraph 5-F of the same exhibit and page shows the
Governor's proposal to permit taxation above the minimum
school program only upon a vote of those people to be
taxed, i.e., qualified taxpaying electors. At page 9 of that
exhibit, paragraph 7-F and 8-F, the Governor recommended
the transfer of use of an existing income to the· state from
the School Lunch Fund to the Uniform School Fund. This
involved an earmarking of funds only, not the resort to a
new source of taxes.
Subsequent messages were given to the Legislature
(Exhibits G, H, and I) in which local property taxes in
various forms were dealt with (a municipal four-mill levy
and a levy to secure general obligation bonds); but at no
point was reference made to any other form of taxation or
to state taxation.
The Governor recommended the abolition of certain
schools as a means of increasing available aid to elementary
and secondary education, but this can no more be said to be
a "revenue" measure than can his admonition to curtail
excesses i~ the system.
The call of the Special Session had been an upshot
of demands for investigation and action to remedy "the
public .school problem." In 1951 the Utah Legislature
created a Public School Survey Commission (Ch. 14, Laws
of 1951, 1st S. S.) . The duties of the Commission were to
study all ramifications of the educational program in the
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State of Utah and to make recommendations. Among their
duties was the study of "taxation and permanent financing of public education, including the adequacy and equity
of the present tax base for the support of public schools."
Sec. 3 (g), Ch. 14, Laws of 1951, 1st S. S. This latter duty
the Commission had not sufficient time to perform and in
their final report of February, 1953, to the Governor and
Legislature, at page 188, said:
"The Commission has not undertaken a detailed
study of tax sources to help provide revenue for
financing the state-supported minim urn school program" (Exhibit J, para.. 2).
Because of this circumstance the 1953 Legislature
assigned that study to the Legislative Council (S. J. R. 26,
Laws of 1953). Thereafter the State Tax Commission· employed special research experts to assist in that study.
Neither agency had reported to the Legislature at the time
of the Special Session (Exhibit J, para. 3).
The Survey Commission reported to the Legislative
Council on those matters\ not related to taxation and the
latter began drafting legislation to effect the recommendations of the Survey Commission. Those bills of the Council
affecting school finance constituted the program recommended by the Governor in his message of December 4th
(Exhibit J, para. 4; Exhibit F, pages 7 and 8).
The Legislative Council, under its statutory duty to
disseminate information to each member of the Legislature,
compiled a staff report annexing thereto its proposed
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legislation, and in the report explaining the bills drawn
said:
"The recommendations of the Utah Legislative
Council would require some adjustment upwards in
the local levy for a state-supported program and a
slight reduction in the state levy to provide the required state aid. Greater equalization of tax effort
would be possible and added funds would be provided in the minimum program with additional local
leeway. The Council has not recommended any
change in the present tax structure to finance the
proposed legislation. The. completion of the current
!tax study at an early date should afford a sound
basis for constructive recommendations on state
taxation for the next regular session" (Emphasis
added) (Exhibit J, para. 5).
While it must be admitted that the total cost of the
state-supported school program became greater, it is significant that the burden of the state did not. From Exhibit K,
constituting the most reliable figures available at this time
as to the respective cost of a program conducted for the
current fiscal year under the old and under the new laws,
it appears that, considering the accruing state obligation under Teachers' Retirement, the total state obligation actually became less under the new law proposed by the Governor
upon recommendation of the Legislative Council and Survey Commission. When Teachers' Retirement is added to
other costs to the state, the new law totals a greater state
obligation than that actually appropriated under the old
law. However, when the legal requirement of $1,000,000.00
or the actuarial estimate of $2,000,000.00 required of the
state in its contribution to the previous retirement pro-
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gram (and in which the state is in default) is added to the
other costs under the prior law, the state's obligation under
the new law becomes less than under the old law. These new
provisions (H. B.'s 27, 28 and 47 relating to school finance
and S,. B. 22 relating to retirement) were what the Legisllature, the Legislative Council, the Public School Survey
Commission, the Governor, and all interested citizens of the
State of Utah had in mind when they were considering the
"school problem.''

STATEMENT OF POINTSt
POINT I.
THE GOVERNOR DID NOT BY EXPRESS
LANGUAGE CALL SUCH LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE AS WOULD PERMIT IMPOSITION
OF A TAX ON CIGARETTES.
1. The specification of one form of tax does not
permit legislation on all forms or on the general subject of taxation.
2. The Governor, if he authorized an increased tax
at the state level, authorized only a property
tax.
tNote: Due to the required haste in briefing and submitting this
question, the briefs, unfortunately, may not be completely responsive
one to the other. This brief will attempt to meet in Points I and II,
the arguments of plaintiff in its sub-points A, B and C under its
Point I. As to plaintiff's Point II, the defendant will concede that
there is a presumption that every Act of the Legislature is valid.
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POINT II.
THE GOVERNOR PROPOSED NO LEGISLATION MANIFESTLY REQUIRING THE APPROPRIATION OF ADDITIONAL REVENUE
AND DID NOT BY THAT TYPE OF IMPLICATION AUTHORIZE A TAX ON CIGARETTES
(H. B. 34).
1. The Governor's authorized legislation required
no additional state taxes.
2. If the Governor's message and recommended
legislation implied authorization to tax cigarettes, his express words rejected that implication.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE GOVERNOR DID NOT BY EXPRESS
LANGUAGE CALL SUCH LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE AS WOULD PERMIT IMPOSITION
OF A TAX ON CIGARETTES.
Art. VII, Sec. 6 of the Utah Constitution provides:
"On extraordinary occasions, the Governor may
convene the Legislature by proclamation, in which
shall be stated the purpose for which the Legislature
is to be convened, and it shall transact no legislative
business except that for which it was especially convened, or such other legislative business as the Gov-
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ernor may call to its attention while in session. The
Legislature, however, may provide for the expenses
of the session and other matters incidental thereto.
The Governor may also by proclamation convene the
Senate in extraordinary session for the transaction
of executive business."
This provision has been held to be mandatory (State v.
Pugh, 31 Ariz. 317, 252 P. 1018) and any law enacted at
a Special Session other than on the subject or subjects designated by the executive's call or message is without authority and void. State v. Scott, 105 Utah 31, 140 P. 2d 921.
This court in State v. Tweed, 63 Utah 176, 224 P. 443,
and State v. Scott, 105 Utah 31, 140 P. 2d 921, has held
that constitutional provision to have been intended to leave
the matter of Special Sessions of the Legislature in the
hands of the Governor and to the end that he may have
complete control over the "legislative business" that shall
be considered.
For purposes of the argument on this point only, we
might concede that the Governor permitted an increase in
taxes at the state level, for, as we will show, any such tax
could only have been a property tax. We do not concede that
fact for all purposes, for our argument in Point II hereof
attempts to show by accompanying stipulated exhibits that
the program recommended by the Governor, the Legislative
Council, and the Public School Survey Commission was
geared to less state contribution to the state supported
school program, and that no state tax was authorized or
needed. However, even if it be determined as a basic premise that state support was increased at the Special Session
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by bills within the call of th~ Governor, we believe that the
Governor specified only property taxation as a tax to which
resort could be had for obtaining the additional funds required, and our argument under this point is designed to
sho'v that the prevailing weight and better reasoned authority is that such a tax may be specified without opening up the entire field of taxation.
1. The specification of one form of tax does not
permit legislation on all forms or on· the general subject of taxation.

One major purpose of provisions of this nature is that
notice shall be given to the public that certain subjects are
to be considered, thus warning all persons interested to be
present if they so desire, so that rights and interests may
not be acted upon without notice. 50 Am. Jur., p. 64, Statutes, Sec. 46. Richmond v. Lay, 261 Ky. 138, 87 S. W. 2d
134. In that latter case a call was issued to raise revenue
for schools, a call substantially broader as pertains to the
field of taxation than the call in this case, and at the Session a bill was enacted to require payment of a $2.00 renewal fee for teachers' certificates and to permit lifetime
certificates for teachers having twenty years' service. The
$2.00 fee was approved as being a revenue measure. The
life certificate provision was struck down as being without
the call.
In Smith et al. v. Curran, 268 Mich. 366, 256 N. W.
453, the Governor issued a proclamation permitting legislation to validate bonds previously voted, but having technical deficiencies otherwise. The admitted purpose of the
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call was to validate an entire $360,000,000.00 package of
refunding bonds. However, of that package a portion had
not been authorized by vote and the case indicates that deficiency could have been cured by the Legislature, it not
being a constitutional question. The court held: Those
bonds not authorized by a vote of the people were not validated. The call was sufficiently restrictive to permit validation of only voted bonds. Thus we have a situation strikingly parallel to the one here considered. Rights of individuals, i. e., th~se required to consent by popular vote,
could not be invaded without a call sufficiently broad to
apprise them of action permitted at the Special Session
(Exhibit F, p. 8, para. 5, 6). The court developed in the
Curran decision the theory defendants now adopt as to the
meaning of the term "subject" or "legislative business".
Evolving the rule of Michigan the court held:
"The 'subject' submitted in the message was
wholesale validation of bonds. It covered only kinds
of bonds which form a logical and natural class for
validation separate and distinct from the other
classes also covered by Act 31. While the Governor
within the range of a 'subject' may not restrict the
Legislature, he has the authority to limit the subject
according to his conception of the need for legislation. Thus a proposal for action upon a certain tax

would not throw open the ~vhole matter of taxation
for legislation or a recommendation as to a crime
would not include the entire realm of criminal law"
(Emphasis added) .
The· functioning of state government may be divided
into numerous and heterogeneous subjects: Public welfare,
public service, public works, public lands, schools, and tax-
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ation, to name only a few. Each of these broad subjects
has as many component parts as the sum of its functions,
~uties, powers, inhibitions, limitations and requirements
for support, operation and maintenance. Thus each "subject" of government may be subdivided into molecular components, each of which is logically, distinctly separable
from, though related to, all the othe-rs. None is wholly unrelated to any other, and by imaginative strain, any infinitesimal part of one subject may be made to relate to
any part of almost any other subject. But just a-s the general
subject "anilnal" may by the addition of qualifying limitations be reduced to the concept "man" and this down to
some special race or class or group of men, the consideration
of any general subject of state government may be reduced
by restricted modification to one of its functions, duties,
powers or requirements. State v~ Woollen, 128 Tenn. 456,
161 S. W. 1006. Thus consideration of any function of government, such as taxation, may be logically restricted as to
the field of its operation, the class to be regulated, the
group to be affected, and the subject matter to be taxed.
In the Woollen case (128 Tenn. 456, 161 S. W. 1006) it is
held in a well reasoned and much cited decision that the
Governor may specify the general subject of appropriations
and- then, by specifying the institutions to which appropriations are to be made, so restrict the call and the general
subject, appropriations, as to exclude appropriation to any
and all other institutions and departments.
In Commonwealth v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 A. 697,
an academic discussion and analysis of the cases involved
treats the question of whether or not when a general sub-
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ject is stated, the specification of a particular matter in
connection therewith opens the door for legislation germane
to the general subject, but beyond the scope of the specification. Commonwealth v. Liveright holds that it does not.
The court at page 704, 161 Atl. said:
"There are some decisions which go to the extent of holding that when a general subject is mentioned the doors are thrown open to legislation on
that subject. But these authorities appear to be in

the minority and are opposed to the well considered
opinions of other states" (Emphasis added).
Cited with approval are the Woollen case (128 Tenn. 456,
161 S. W. 1006) and Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company v. Moss, 50 Colo. 282, 115 P. 696.
The Colorado case holds that when the specification
is too broad, the result is that no subject is constitutional
for the reason that the spirit of the constitutional provision
limiting the scope of legislation would be emasculated. No
notice could be given to interested persons, nor could any
restraint be imposed against over-legislation at the taxpayers' expense. 50 Am. Jur., p. 64, Statutes, Sec. 46. In
the Liveright case at page 715 of 161 Atl., an illustration
is made of the inequities stemming from the broad interpretation and application of a call upon a subject. Although
writing a dissenting opinion, this Judge agrees with the
majority in its holding that permission to consider a portion of one subject does not permit legislation on the entire
subject. In so doing he says :
"For instance, if the Governor designated the
subject of 'taxation' as one of those to be considered,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
then any and every branch of that subject, taxation
upon capital stock, taxation upon inheritanc-es, taxation upon moneys and interest, etc. could be made
the subject of legislation at the 'special session'
* * * On the other hand i{ the subject of the
tax on capital stock was the only one designated in
the proclamation, none of the other branches of the
general subject of taxation could constitutionally be
passed upon by the Legislature at that whole session.
Up to this point also the whole court agrees."
A case almost startingly in point is Simms v. Weldon,
165 Ark. 13, 263 S. W. 42. In that case the Governor issued
a call to raise revenues for schools in response to a widespread public demand prompting the Governor to act. The
Governor's opening message to the Legislature stated:
"The financial distress of the public schools of
the state has compelled me to convene you for the
purpose of considering and passing laws for relief."
The Governor included in his call taxation on income, a
severance tax and matters regarding collection of gross
income taxes. The session passed an act levying a tax on
the sale of cigars and cigarettes. The court held the tax
invalid, saying :
"The Governor specified presumably all that
was in his mind at the time he issued the proclamation and we are not at liberty to go back of that call
to determine what purpose the taxation was intended
for. The call was to pass an income tax law and
the passage of such a law, regardless of the approprh1tion of the revenues thus raised, would have been
within the call, but any other kind of a tax, regardles_s of the appropriation to any given use was not
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within the call. The mental attitude of the Governor
as to his intention, not expressed in the proclamation, does not supply tbe specifications required by
the Constitution. The fact that the other taxes represented in the call were earmarked for use by the
schools does not broaden the scope of the call, for
neither relates to a sales tax on cigarettes and cigars."
That court agreed that the Governor was required to
confine legislation to particular subjects, but should not and
in some instances may not specify details into which the
Legislature may go in dealing with that subJect, but held
that the purposes of the legislation must be definitely specified either broadly or in detail in the call or the message.
This case has been cited with approval by that jurisdiction in Hope v. Oliver, 196 Ark. 394, 117 S. W. 2d 1072.
In the Oliver case the call provided for the removal of
toll fares on bridges. The Legislature passed an act to replace revenues lost by bridge tolls which imposed a fee for
auto inspection. It was held that that fee was not within
the call. The court admitted the presumption of validity of
all acts passed by the Legislature and conceded the argument that the ·Legislature can, within the scope of the call,
decide what is best for the state. It was argued in that case
that to keep bridges free from tolls, revenues should be
raised to supplant toll revenues. The court said that presumably the Governor considered the loss of revenues and
discounted the need for remedial legislation. Otherwise,
they said, he would have included the suggestion to raise a
revenue to bridge that deficiency.
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An Arkansas case (McCarrell v. Clyde C. L. 198 Ark.
896, 132 S. W. 2d 19) although holdin-g the act there in
question valid, cited the Weldon case as being established
law in that state. That latter case did not weaken the holding of the Weldon case. The call was broad : to create a
fund for tubercular treatment. No specification reduced its
all-encompassing character. We agree with this holding.
In Stocke v. Edwards, 295 Mo. 402, 244 S. W. 802, the
Governor's call recommended that assessors in cities of
over 500,000 inhabitants be made elective. An act providing for that election, establishing a new Board of Tax
Equalization and defining new duties for both the assessor
and the new Board was held beyond the scope of the call.
The Legislature under that call was not permitted to enact
a measure covering a greater number of details and particulars relating to the authority and duties of the
assessors although it was permitted to deal with assessors as
to the election thereof. That case cited with approval State
ex rel Rice v. Edwards, ... Mo .... , 241 S. W. 945. There
the Governor called for re-districting of cities for the election of Justices of the Peace. The act as passed dealt with
both Justices of the Peace and Constables. The manner
of dealing with Justices of the Peace was within the call,
but the subject of constables was without and the act was
voided.
In State v. Adams, 323 Mo. 729, 19 S. W. 2d 671, a call
to restore capital punishment and fix the method of execution was held not to include the power to permit the jury
to decide whether death should or should not be imposed~
The court held the intent was to restore capital punishment
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and fix the method of sentence and not to deal with who
should choose the sentence to be imposed.
In Wells v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 110
Mo. 286, 19 S. W. 530, a call authorized the Legislature to
pass laws correcting abuses, unjust discrimination and extortion on rates of railroads. An act required safety appliances on railroad switches and abolished the defense of
contributory negligence in situations arising therefrom.
The court held that the Legislature was called to correct
abuses by railroads, but those abuses were spelled out· in
the form of rates and not general abuses of railroads.
Similarly, Trenton Graded School Districts v. Board of
Education, 278 Ky. 607, 129 S. W. 143 holds that the general subject matter (in this instance schools) can be limited
by specifications of what problems may be considered in
regard to schools, and an act would be held invalid providing
for annexation to school districts under a call to provide
approved high school service for all pupils, and to deal with
teachers' retirement. Columbia & Pulaski Turnpike Company v. Hughes, 174 S. W. 1108, 131 Tenn. 267 held that a
call to enact a regulation for turnpikes did not open the
session to any type of a road.
All of these cases hold that the specification of a particular, within a general, subject opens the session only
for consideration of the particular, not the general, subject.
The lesser cannot include the greater, and when the authority is given to deal with a subject only as it relates to
revenues for a specific purpose, the original subject cannot be dealt with in a manner designed to change its entire
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structure. In Re Opinion of the Justices, 94 Colo. 215, 29
P. 2d 705. In that case a call "to provide aid for the destitute and suffering" did not permit the enactment of an
elaborate code controlling liquor although a portion of the
revenue provided for in that code was earmarked for the
purposes enumerated in the call. We cite this case not for
its implication that elaborate regulation of smoking could
not have here been enacted under the Governor's call, but
cite it for its holding, as applied to this case, that the state's
tax structure may not be invaded or realigned under the
guise of providing some revenues for the purposes in the
call.
Exhibit J affirmatively shows that the tax problem had
been deferred by the Public School Survey Commission,
the Legislative Council and the Governor (Exhibit J, paras.
2, 3, 4, ·5 and 6). We show tho~e exhibits not to establish
lack of wisdom in the cigarette tax, but to show that it
was a legitimately separate, logically distinct subject deemed by all three principals quoted in that Exhibit to be
separate and apart from the "school problem" to be remedied at this session.
As said in Commonwealth v. Liveright, 161 Atl. at
page 403:
,-,This constitutional provision [limiting the subject matter at special sessions] contemplates that
there shall first exist in the executive's mind a definite conception of the public emergency which demands an extraordinary session. His mental attitude or intention is expressed in his proclamation,
the purpose of which is to inform the members of
the Legislature of subjects for legislation and to
advise the public generally that objections may be
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presented if desired. It is not only a guide or chart
with respect to which the Legislature may act, but
also a check restricting its action so that rights may
not be affected without notice. The proclamation
may contain many or few subjects according to the
Governor's conception of the public need. While the
subjects may be stated broadly or in general terms,
the special business as related to the general subject
on which legislation is desired should be designated
by imposing qualifying matter to. reduce or restric·t"
(Emphasis added) .
2. The Gove~nor, if he authorized an increased tax
at the state level, authorized only a property
tax.
Sec. 59-9-4, U. C. A. 1953 provides as follows:
"The commission shall then determine the minimum rate of levy on each dollar of assessed valuation of the tangible property in the state that will
raise sufficient supplementary revenue to pay the
state's contribution to the cost of the minimum
school program for that year and any deficiency
from previous years, provided that in accordance
with the provisions of section 7, Article XIII, of the
Constitution of the state of Utah, not more than
75% of the state's portion of the revenue necessary
to finance the operation and maintenance of such
minimum school program shall be raised by the state
property tax levy. The commission shall take into
consideration, from the best information available,
and shall make allowance for, the estimated tax delinquency for the current year, and shall be conservative in its estimate of revenue to assure to the
extent possible amnle funds for the state's contribution to the cost of the minimum school program.
The tax commission shall immediately thereafter
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transmit to the county auditor of each county and
to the state auditor a statement of such rate, and
upon its receipt the county auditor must, in writing,
notify the state tax commission of the receipt thereof."
Under that section the state's property tax levy is
geared to· meet the st.ate's required contribution to the
minimum school program under any such definition of that
program as the Legislature may prescribe, after other
revenues to the fund have been exhausted. Sec. 59-9-3 1
was amended by H. B. 28 of the Special Session to require
school districts to exert greater effort locally which amounted to an automatic deduction of the state's obligation under
59-9-4. Even without the stern mandate to local districts
for increased effort 59-9-4 would still have operated to provide the state's contribution to the new minimum school
program and thus even if the new program proved to be
more costly to the state 2 the Governor's call would have
specified only property taxation at both the state and local
levels since, of course, property taxation is the only means
of revenue for .school districts 3 •
Some states, we will concede, have a rule that the specification of a particular subject opens the entire subject for
legislation. Baldwin v. State, 21 Tex. App. 591, 3 S. W.
109. Martin v. Riley, 20 Cal. 2d 28, 123 P. 2d 491 seems to
follow that view but an examination of that case shows
that the court quite possibly had no occasion to decide that
The statute requiring a certain amount of local effort by school districts participating in a supplementary state-guaranteed program.
2
Which we doubt from our interpretation of Exhibit K.
3 Secs. 59-9-2, 59-9-3, 53-7-8, 53-7-9, 53-7-10, 53-7-12, 53-7-13, U. C. A.
1953.
1
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question. The dissent (page 497 of 123 P. 2d) forcibly
argues that the specification within the general subject
was broad enough to cover the legislation enacted and that
the rule of the majority therefore was unnecessarily broad.
Likewise Blackford v. Judith Basin County, 109' Mont. 578,
98 P. 2d 872, 162 A. L. R. 639 could have been similarly
decided. If those cases do stand, however, for the rule
that the designation of any part of a subject opens the
entire subject for legislative action, we believe them to be
in the decided minority. The California case bases its holding on the Texas case (Baldwin v. State, 3 S. W. 109, 21
Tex. App. 591) which has been sharply criticized in recent
decisions such as Commonwealth v. Liveright, 161 Atl. 697
at 704, 308 Pa. 35, and is diametrically opposed by Smith
et al v. Curran, 268 Mich. 366, 256 N. W. 453.
Extended, the Texas rule permits absolutely no executive control over the special session since one might be defied to find any subject for legislation that is not in some
manner related to the subject in the call, no matter how
particularly the latter is specified. Thus every call might
imply a tax either for the administration, support or maintenance of the subject to be considered. Merely the call for
any Special Session of the Legislature would then be notice
to every citizen and every person conducting affairs in
the state that his rights might be affected. The Constitution has limited the Legislature in this regard to one such
general session each biennium.
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POINT II.
THE GOVERNOR PROPOSED NO LEGISLATION MANIFESTLY REQUIRING THE APPROPRIATION OF ADDITIONAL REVENUE
AND DID NOT BY THAT TYPE OF IMPLICATION AUTHORIZE A TAX ON CIGARETTES
(H. B. 34).
1. The Governor's authorized legislation required

no additional state taxes.
Plaintiff will argue that the total cost of the minimum
school program was increased by the First Special Session
of the 30th Legislature. This we will concede (Exhibit K).
However, the minor premise upon which plaintiff builds his
hypothesis that the increased program requires new and
additional revenue imposed and collected at the state level
we believe to be false. Plaintiff says public schools now
cost more money. The state contributes to the public school
system, therefore the st~te must collect more taxes. Except for the enactment of a novel program of shifting the
burden between state and local effort, this would be valid.
The theme of H. B.'s 27 and 28 and S. B. 22 was to
require greater local effort _for better equalization (Exhibit J, para. 5). A comparison of the figures opposite
Item 5, Exhibit K indicates as much. It is common knowledge, likewise susceptible of judicial notice, that ·the State
of Utah has become in arrears some $8,000,000.00 in its
debt to the Teachers' Retirement Fund. The new law
(S. B. 22) provides for liquidation of that debt and integrated state-social security retirement benefits at less state
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obligation without doing violence to vested rights of members of the system. In adding items 3 and 4 of Exhibit
K the state contribution is higher under the new law than
under the old school progr~m. However, the footnotes show
that even if the state were up to date on its payments into
the Teachers' Retirement Fund under prior law their obligation for this year only would nevertheless carry the
state's legal obligation over its expected obligation under the
new law both for Teachers' Retirement and for operation
~nd maintenance of the minimum school program otherwise.
Approximately two and one-half years of study of
the "school problem" had at the time of the session yielded
no answer to the tax structure and the equitable apportionment of the burden between property and non-property revenues. The subject, therefore, had been deferred ·pending
th outcome of a study conducted by the Legislative Council
and the Tax Commission (Exhibit J. paras. 3 and 5). The
Special Session was for the purpose of re-determining the
classroom unit and realigning the respective property tax
burden to be imposed as between the state and the local
taxing authority. The question was: From where should
the increased cost come? It was assumed by the School
Survey Commission, the Legislative Council and the Governor that it must come from property taxation. The second question then was: At what level? It clearly appears
from the schedule in Exhibit K that the lot fell to the local
districts.
After two and one-half years of study by research
agencies of the Legislature contrived to study and investi-
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gate the "school problem" and after that study yielded
only the assurance that the tax structure would be studied
and recommended for action at the 1955 General Session,
a spontaneous proposition to create a new and additional
tax without notice, consideration or calculation appears all
the more abortive and repugnant to the constitutional considerations of notice and opportunity to be represented and
to the "Governor's conception of the public emergency
which demands an extraordinary session." Commonwealth
v. Liveright, supra. The Legislature chose to substitute its
own judgment for that of the Governor as to what the extraordinary circumstance constituted in violation of Art. VII,
Sec. 6.
It may not be said that the Governor was attempting to
"dictate" to the Legislature when his recommendations
were precisely those of the two research agencies 4 of the
Legislature. To say that the Governor has violated the
separation of powers by dictating to the Legislature that
the increased cost of the school program shall be borne by
property taxation whether state or local is to say that the
parents who bear children to attend schools dictate to the
Legislature for the same reason; for if the definition of
the minimum school program had remained the same the
state's contribution to that program would have increased
year by year by virtue of the provisions of 59-9-4, which
requires a state contribution to guarantee the minimum
school program based upon a given number of dollars for
each thirty students who attend school. If the law had re4

Public School Survey Commission (Ch. 14, Laws of 1951, 1st. S. S.);
Legislative Council (Ch. 4, Title 36, U. C. A. 1953).
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mained unchanged the state's commitment would have risen
at a ratio of almost 3 to 1 over local contributions as school
population increased. All this without any action by the
Legislature.
2. If the Governor's message and recommended
legislation implied authorization to tax cigarettes, his express words rejected that implication.

If it be said that from portions of the Governor's
proclamation and messages it may be implied that he expected the Legislature to respond thereto by opening up new
and additional sources of revenue, then the express language
of the Governor repudiates and completely traverses any
such implication~ The Governor said in his message of December 4, 1953 :
"I am not here to propose new or higher taxes
to finance the school program."
If the Governor had said "Here is the school problem
-solve it," he would have violated every purpose and
.spirit of Art. VII, Sec. 6. See Denver & ·Rio Grande Railroad Company v. Moss, 50 Colo. 282, 115 P. 696; Nielson v.
Chicago C. B. & 0. R. R. Company (C. C. A.) 187 Fed. 393.
No act passed could have been responsive to that call. The
Governor could in our opinion have specified certain subjects within which the Legislature might act and only
legislation responsive to that charted program and to that
notice to the public could have been constitutionally enacted.
Commonwealth v. Liveright; Smith v. Curran, supra. By

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26

implication he would have denied the power to act in other
subjects. But by expressly prohibiting in no uncertain terms
their promiscuous activity in the field of taxation he did
more toward outlining the program and defining proper
fi~lds of legislation than was required of him. That express
rejection of new or increased taxes dispels any implied
acceptance of them. The Governor's veto message (Exhibit J, para. 6) shows his intent as it related back to his
original message. While the bill would not have been valid
even had he signed it5 the Governor's omission to argue the
merits of the bill in his veto message shows clearly what his
"mental attitude, intention or conception of the public
need" 6 was, since he rejected it upon the ground that he
had not previously admitted it.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion and summary we urge this Court to adopt
the majority view that the enumeration of items within
one general subject in th~· Governor's proclamation for· a
Special Session does not open that session for consideration of any unnam~d part of the general subject. Alternatively "\Ve submit that even if that rule is not adopted that
the court take judicial notice of the apparent conclusion
that nothing transpiring at the First Special Session of the
30th Legislature required a resort to state taxation at all,
since the burden of the increased cost of the minimum
school program was thrown upon local districts and the
5
6

State v. Scott, 105 Utah 31, 140 P. 2d 929.
Commonwealth v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 Atl. 697, 703.
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burden of teachers' retirement was appreciably shifted to
Federal Social Security coverage. We respectfully urge ~hat
under no theory can it be said that the Governor proposed
a program demanding new or increased taxation in any
field other than local property or state-local property taxation and created no condition requiring resort to new
sources.
We respectfully contend that under no theory of this
case can H. B. 34 be said to have been within the scope of
the Governor's proclamation or subsequent messages to the
Legislature and it is therefore unconstitutional under the
mandatory limitation in Art.- VII, Sec. 6, Constitution of
Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,

Attorney General,
KEN CHAMBERLAIN,

Assistant Attorney General,
H. R. WALDO, JR.,

Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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